Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1982

Western Development Company v. Arthur H. Nell
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin, Richards and Mattson; Attorneys for Appellants .
Unknown.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Western Development Company v. Nell, No. 8293.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/442

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UUKI

:.u-.r.
:T NO..

STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
— vs.—
ARTHUR H. NELL and LORNA V. NELL,
his wife, and LUELLA T. VOORHEES,
Defendants and Appellants,
D. S. BAKER,
Defendant
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent,
and
HENRY I. VOORHEES and AILEEN
VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD
VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his
wife,
Third-Party Defendants and Appellants.
WESTERN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
— vs.—
HENRY I. VOORHEES and AILEEN
VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD
VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his
wife,
Defendants and Appellants,
D. S. BAKER,
Defendant
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent,
and
ARTHUR N. NELL and LORNA V. NELL,
his wife, and LUELLA T. VOORHEES,
Third-Party Defendants and Appellants.

BEIEF OF APPELLAN1
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District
in and for Sevier County, Utah
HONORABLE JOHN L. SEVY, JR., Jui\)t\

k

GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON
Attorneys
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, for.
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

PREFATORY STATEMENT

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

STATEMENT OF POINTS

9

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court erred in determining that Knight
Investment Company reserved by Exhibit " B " (R. 7981) the oil and gas within Tract I above described
A.

B.

II.

10

10

Argument based on the assumption that the
Court holds Exhibit " B " to be clear and unambiguous so as to require construction thereof
without resort to extraneous matters in determining whether the intention was to reserve oil and
gas

10

Argument based on the assumption that the Court
determines Exhibit " B " to be ambiguous and to
require resort to extrinsic matters to construe
the same and to determine the intention of the
parties thereto as to whether gas and oil were
reserved

31

The District Court erred in determining that Isaac
D. Voorhees and wife conveyed to Knight Investment
Company by Exhibit "D" (R. 85-86A) the oil and gas
within Tract III above mentioned
34
A.

B.

Argument based on the assumption that the Court
holds Exhibit "D" to be clear and unambiguous
on its face and to require construction thereof
without resort to extraneous matters in determining whether or not the intention was to grant oil
and gas

34

Argument based on the assumption that the Court
determines Exhibit "D" to be obscure and ambiguous on its face and to require resort to extraneous matters to construe the same and to
determine whether or not the parties thereto intended to grant oil and gas
36

CONCLUSION

37

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued)
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co. (Okla. 1917) 167 Pac.
468

30

Barnard-Argue-Roth-Stearas Oil & Gas Co. v. Farquharson
(Eng. 1912) AC 864, Ann. Cas. 1913B 1212

22

Bundy v. Myers et al (Pa. 1953) 94 A. 2d 724, 2 Oil & Gas
Rep. 352

30

Carothers v. Mills (Tex. 1921) 232 S.W. 155

26

Carson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al. (Ark. 1948)
209 S.W. 2d 97, 1 A.L.R. 2d 784

22

Clements v. Morgan (Ky. 1948) 211 S.W. 2d 164

26

Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 160 Pac. 121

13

Cornwell v. Buck & Stoddard (Calif. 1938) 82 Pac. 2d 516

23

Deseret Livestock Co. v. State et al, 110 Utah 239, 171 Pac.
2d 401
15
Detlor v. Holland (Ohio 1898) 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A. 266
24
Dierk Lumber & Coal Co. v. Myer, 85 Fed. Supp. 157

13

Easley et al v. Melton et al (Ky. 1953) 262 S.W. 2d 686

26

Elkhorn Coal Corp. et al v. Yonts et al (Ky. 1953) 262 S.W.
2d 384

26

Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. v. Right of Way Oil Co.,
(Tex. 1911) 137 S.W. 171

23

Gordon v. Carter Oil Co. (1924) 19 Ohio App. 319

22

Haynes v. Hunt et al, 96 Utah 348, 85 Pac. 2d 861

19

Horse Creek Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff, (W. Va. 1918)
95 S.E. 26
22, 28
Hudson v. McGuire (Ky. 1920) 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148.. 20
Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co. (La. 1922)
91 So. 676
21, 28
Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v. Preece, et al (Ky. 1935) 86 S.W.
2d 163

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued)
Page
Long et al v. Madison Coal Co. (Ky. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 937,
4 Oil & Gas Rep. 226

26

McKinney's Heirs v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. (Ky. 1909)
120 S.W. 314, 20 Ann. Cas. 934

20

Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al v. Strohacker (Ark. 1941)
152 S.W. 2d 557

24

Murphy v. VanVoorhis (W. Va. 1923) 119 S.E. 297

19

Nephi Plastering & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County (1907) 33 Utah
114, 93 Pac. 53

15

Praeletorian Diamond Oil Assoc, v. Garvey (Tex.) 15 S.W.
2d 698

23

Prindle v. Baker (W. Va. 1935) 178 S.E. 513

13

Rice v. Blanton (Ky. 1929) 22 S.W. 2d 580

15

Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co.
(Tex. 1913) 157 S.W. 737, 51 L.R.A. N.S. 268
28,29
Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co. (W.
Va. 1918) 17 A.L.R. 144
26,27
Shell Oil Co. v. Moore (111. 1943) 48 N.E. 2d 400

21

State v. Indiana, etc., Min. Co., 22 N.E. 778, 6 L.R.A. 579

24

Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co. (W. Va. 1908) 61 S.E. 307

27

U.S. Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co. (6 Cir. 1924)
296 Fed. 320

26

Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Cons. Mining Co.
(1926) 69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672

15

Vogel v. Cobb (Okla. 1943) 141 Pac. 2d 276, 148 A.L.R.
774

29

Williams v. Citizens Enterprise Co., 153 Ind. 496, 55 N.E.
425
24
Winsett v. Watson (Tex. 1947) 206 S.W. 2d 656

13

Witherspoon et ux v. Campbell (Miss. 1954) 69 So. 2d 384

26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—(Continued)
TEXTS
Page
17 A.L.R. Annotation 156
26
17 A.L.R. Annotation 164
29
86 A.L.R. Annotation 983
26
86 A.L.R. Annotation 987
29
86 A.L.R. Annotation 987
19
1 A.L.R. 2d Annotation 787
22
37 A.L.R. 2d Annotation 1441
26
37 A.L.R. 2d Annotation 1449
29
37 A.L.R. 2d Annotation 1453-4
19
16 Am. Jur. 527-8
12
16 Am. Jur. 527, 528, 531, 580, 599 and 615
12
16 Am. Jur. 533
17
16 Am. Jur. 532, 533, 534
,
17
16 Am. Jur. 537
28
16 Am. Jur. 580
12
16 Am. Jur. 599 and 615
30
16 Am. Jur. 615
30
36 Am. Jur. 303
30
36 Am. Jur. 305
17
Black's Law Dictionary, 1910 Edition, page 780
24
Federal Leasing Act of February 25, 1920
9, 32
L.R.A. 1918A Annotation 491
13
Lindley, Mines & Mining, Sec. 87 et seq
27
Oil & Gas Possibilities of Utah
16
Plate II — "Oil and Gas Wells of Utah, 1891-1948" (Part
of Oil & Gas Possibilities of Utah)
16
18 R.C.L. 1093
27
1 Summers Oil & Gas, Sec. 135
14,15

STATUTES AND BULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
— vs.—
ARTHUR H. NELL and LORNA V. NELL,
his wife, and LUELLA T. VOORHEES,
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Defendant
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a corporation,
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VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD
VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his
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HENRY I. VOORHEES and AILEEN
VOORHEES, his wife, and HILLARD
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D. S. BAKER,
Defendant
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent,
and
ARTHUR N. NELL and LORNA V. NELL,
his wife, and LUELLA T. VOORHEES,
Third-Party Defendants and Appellants.

Civil No.
8293

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS ARTHUR H. NELL and LORNA
V. NELL, his wife, LUELLA T. VOORHEES, HENRY I.
VOORHEES and AILEEN VOORHEES, his wife, and
HILLARD VOORHEES and PEARL VOORHEES, his wife.
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PREFATORY STATEMENT
The Appellants named above are Defendants and
Third-Party Defendants in two civil actions instituted
by Western Development Company, a corporation, as
Plaintiff, to quiet title to certain alleged rights, particularly gas and oil, in lands described in its Complaint.
Mountain Fuel Supply Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as Mountain Fuel, Cross-Complained
against Appellants in both actions, basing" its alleged
rights on an Oil and Gas Lease from Plaintiff, Exhibit
"N" (R. 113-116).
Appellants Answered, raising issues as to the ownership of oil and gas, and also Counter-Claimed against
Plaintiff and Cross-Complained against Plaintiff's Lessee, Mountain Fuel, as to Tracts I and I I I hereinafter
identified, and sought thereby to quiet their respective
titles to the oil and gas rights in said Tracts. After all
pleadings had been filed, a Stipulation was entered into
(R. 55-117), consolidating the two cases, admitting various facts, and stipulating to such facts as being true and
correct, which Stipulation incorporates and includes Exhibits "A" to "0", both inclusive (R. 77-117).
The consolidated cases were submitted to the District Court of Sevier County, Utah, on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 122-123), joined in by
Mountain Fuel (R. 123) as Plaintiff's Lessee, and on a
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment made by Appellants (R. 125, 261-262). By Order dated April 12, 1954,
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the District Court denied both Motions (R. 263-4).
At a subsequent hearing held June 11, 1954, none of
the parties offered any additional evidence. After the
submission of additional arguments and briefs, the District Court made its decision (R. 290-3) granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Appellants' Cross-Motion. Consolidated Findings and Conclusions (R, 294-324) and Consolidated Decree and Judgment (R. 325-329) were entered accordingly. The instant Appeal is taken from that portion of the Consolidated Decree and Judgment quoted in Appellants'
Amended Notice of Appeal (R. 334-336).
The actions also involved numerous issues between
Appellants and Mountain Fuel on one side and Defendant D. S. Baker on the other side pertaining to purported
Leases from Appellants to Defendant D. S. Baker, which
issues were determined in favor of Appellants and Mountain Fuel and against Defendant D. S. Baker (R. 322323). From such adverse judgment, Defendant Baker
has not appealed or cross-appealed, the time for so doing
having now expired. By virtue thereof, the District
Court's determination is binding and conclusive as to
Defendant Baker, and the issues involving him may now
be ignored, which issues were the subject of a great portion of the pleadings.
Throughout this Brief, certain words or clauses are
shown by us in italics for purposes of emphasis and are
not italicized in any instruments being quoted.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issues before the Utah Supreme Court are limited to a determination of the ownership as between Plaintiff and its Lessee, Mountain Fuel, on the one side, and
Appellants on the other side of oil and gas in, under and
upon certain parcels of land in the high mountain ranges
of Sevier County, Utah, identified as Tracts I and I I I
in the Stipulation above mentioned (E. 56-57), which
Tract I is shown in brown color on Exhibit "Q" (E. 260)
and which Tract III is shown in red color on said Exhibit
"Q"..
In connection with said Tract I (Sections 4 and 17
and the Northwest quarter of Section 9, Township 22
South, Bange 4 East, S.L.M. containing 1440 acres), both
Appellants and Respondents claim such oil and gas rights
as successors in interest to Knight Investment Company,
a corporation, which owned the fee simple title in and
to said lands on and prior to March 29,1916. On that date
Knight Investment Company made a Deed, Exhibit " B "
(B. 79-81) conveying said Tract I to Isaac D. Voorhees,
the predecessor in interest of the Appellants Henry I.
Voorhees and Hillard Voorhees, which Deed contained
the following reservation provisions:
"Eeserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns all the coal, gold, silver, lead,
copper and other precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights.
"Eeserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns rights-of-way for roads, rail-
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roads, telegraph and telephone lines, water pipe
lines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal
mine appurtenances of all kinds by paying therefor to the party of the second part at the rate of
Six Dollars per acre.
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns the further right to go upon the
surface of the premises herein conveyed, to prospect for coal, gold, silver, lead, copper and other
precious and valuable ores and also for the purpose of making surveys for any and all purposes.
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns the further right to any and all
timber on the surface of the premises herein conveyed, except sufficient timber of aspen quality
for corral and road purposes, which is hereby
reserved to the party of the second part.
"Reserving unto the said grantor, its successors and assigns the further right to any and all
waters that may be developed through tunnels or
other underground workings made or used by the
party of the first part."
Whatever title Isaac D. Voorhees obtained to oil
and gas in said Tract I by virtue of such Deed now belongs to Appellants Henry I. and Hillard Voorliees as
his successors in interest. Whatever title to oil and gas
Knight Investment Company reserved and retained by
said Deed in said Tract I is now owned by the Plaintiff,
subject to its Oil and Gas Lease to Mountain Fuel.
In connection with Tract III described in the Stipulation (R. 56-57) and being parts of Sections 5, 6, 7, 8
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and 18, Township 22 South, Eange 4 East, and of Sections 1, 12 and 13, Township 22 South, Eange 3 East,
S.L.M., containing a total of 1280 acres, more or less,
both Appellants Arthur H. and Lorna V. Nell and Luella
T. Voorhees on the one side and Eespondents on the
other side claim oil and gas rights as successors in interest to Isaac D. Voorhees and wife. Said Isaac D. Voorhees owned the full fee simple title in and to said Tract
I I I on and prior to April 3, 1916, on which date he and
his wife made a Deed, Exhibit " D " (E. 85-86-86A) to
Knight Investment Company, the predecessor in interest
of Plaintiff and Mountain Fuel, its Lessee. Said Deed
was a conveyance of specifically listed rights in and to
the lands described therein, the granting clauses and the
provisions defining the rights and items conveyed being
in the following language :
"WITNESSETH, That the parties of the
first part . . . do grant, bargain, sell and convey
. . . unto the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, all the coal, gold, silver, lead,
copper and other precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights lying or being in
Sevier County, State of LTtah, to-wit:
(particular lands described, including Tract III)
"Together with rights of way for roads, railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, water pipe
lines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal
mine appurtenances of all kinds, by paying therefor to the parties of the first part at the rate of
$6.00 per acre.
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"Together with the further right to go upon
the surface of the premises herein conveyed to
prospect for coal, gold, silver, lead, copper, and
other precious and valuable ores and also for the
purpose of making surveys for any and all purposes.
" Together with the further right to any and
all timber on the surface of the premises herein
conveyed, except sufficient timber of aspen quality for corral and road purposes, which is hereby
reserved to the parties of the first part.
"Together with the further right to any and
all waters that may be developed through tunnels
or other underground workings made or used by
the party of the second part."
Whatever title to oil and gas rights Knight Investment Company acquired in Tract I I I by virtue of such
Deed now belongs to its successor in interest, the Plaintiff herein, subject to Plaintiff's Lease to Mountain Fuel.
Whatever title to oil and gas in said Tract I I I Isaac D.
Voorhees and his wife did not convey by said Deed, Exhibit "D", to Knight Investment Company now belongs
to Arthur H. and Lorna V. Nell, his wife, and Luella T.
Voorhees as his successors in interest.
On and prior to December 23, 1920, Knight Investment Company was also the owner in fee simple of the
South half and of the Northeast quarter of Section 9,
Township 22 South, Eange 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian,
described and identified as Tract I I in the Stipulation
(E. 56) and shown in purple color on Exhibit "Q" (E.
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260) and of other adjoining lands, but on said date Knight
Investment Company made to Isaac D. Voorhees a Deed,
Exhibit "C" (E, 82-84), conveying said Tract I I to him,
but excepting and reserving "all the coal, hydro-carbons,
gas, oil, gold, silver, lead, copper and other ores or mineral products, with the right and privilege . . . in, under
or upon the surface of the land herein granted, to prospect for and mine coal, hydro-carbons, or any of the ores
or mineral products herein reserved", and containing
further reservation provisions along the lines of those
set forth in Exhibit " B " (B, 79-81). As to said Tract
II, Appellants disclaimed any right, title or interest in
and to the oil and gas therein and thereunder, and all
parties to the consolidated actions stipulated (E. 70) that
the oil and gas rights within and under said Tract I I are
vested in Plaintiff, subject to the rights of Mountain
Fuel by virtue of its Lease from Plaintiff, Exhibit "N"
(E. 113-116). Tract I I is not involved in any issues before the Court, except insofar as the Deed on it (Exhibit
"C") helps disclose the intention of the parties in connection with Exhibits " B " and "D".
Tracts IV, V and VI are not involved in any of the
issues now before the Utah Supreme Court.
The following are matters of general geographical
and historical knowledge of which we feel the Court may
take judicial notice.
All of the lands involved herein are located in the
hig;h plateau or mountain area of Sevier County, Utah.
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Prior to the dates when Exhibits "B" and "C" were made,
March 29 and April 3, 1916, respectively, no oil of commercial value nor any gas source or field worthy of the
name had been discovered in Utah, no drilling of any
nature for gas and oil had been conducted in either Sevier
or Sanpete Counties or in the area of these lands or within some 60 airline or 100 road miles therefrom, and all
oil and gas drillings theretofore conducted in Utah had
been in the low plateaus or swells, valley, river and desert
regions of the state. Certainly it is true that in 1916 the
development of oil and gas in Utah was not of any great
consequence or in the minds of very many people.
It was in 1920 that The Federal Leasing Act pertaining to the leasing of Federally-owned Oil and Gas
Lands was adopted (Act of February 25, 1920). This
gave great impetus to the development of oil and gas
properties and focused attention on oil and gas acreages.
Any further pertinent facts will be developed in
connection with the Argument set forth below.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The District Court erred in determining that
Knight Investment Company reserved by Exhibit "B"
(B. 79-81) the oil and gas within Tract I above described.
II. The District Court erred in determining that
Isaac D. Voorhees and wife conveyed to Knight Investment Company by Exhibit 6iD" (it. 85-86A)the oil and
gas within Tract III above mentioned.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT KNIGHT INVESTMENT COMPANY RESERVED BY
EXHIBIT " B " (R. 79-81) THE OIL AND GAS WITHIN TRACT
I ABOVE DESCRIBED.

We submit that insofar as Utah is concerned, the
matters to be determined herein are questions of first
impression.
A. Argument based on the assumption that the
Court holds Exhibit "B" to be clear and unambiguous
so as to require construction thereof without resort to
extraneous matters in determining whether the intention
was to reserve oil and gas.
If Exhibit "B" is held to be unambiguous and is construed on the basis of the Deed itself and from the face
thereof, without resort to extraneous matters, then Appellants contend that such Exhibit shows on its face and
by the language therein contained, construed in the light
of March, 1916, conditions, that oil and gas were not
reserved nor intended to be reserved thereby. The District Court, by originally denying both Motions for Summary Judgment, determined that the Deed was ambiguous and that resort should be had to extrinsic matters to
determine its meaning and the intention of the parties
with respect to oil and gas. At a further hearing, however, no additional proofs were offered by anyone. The
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Motions for Summary Judgment were reiterated, reargued and briefed, and then followed the Court's decision favorable to Respondents. We submit that whether
or not resort was or is had to extraneous matters, the
decision should have been and should now be that oil
and gas were not reserved by Exhibit "B".
The Motions for Summary Judgment, made under
Rule 56 (c), Utah Rides of Civil Procedure, require the
Court to render a Summary Judgment "forthwith if the
pleadings, deposition and admissions on file . . . show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a Judgment as a matter
of law". Such Motion includes both phases stated above,
that is, if the Deed is not obscure as to whether or not
oil and gas were reserved thereby, then the question
should be determined from the face of the Deed itself,
but if the Deed is ambiguous as to oil and gas, then the
question should be determined from a consideration of
all pleadings and "admissions on file", including the
Stipulation (R. 55-117).
In either event, matters of which the Court may
and should take judicial notice are to be considered, and
in either event certain fundamental rules of law and
particularly rules of construction are applicable. The
crucial question is:
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Did the parties to Exhibit "B", particularly
the Grantor, intend to reserve the oil and gas in
the property conveyed thereby?
The intention of the parties, particularly that of the
Grantor, is controlling, 16 Am. Jur. 527, 528, 531, 580,
599 and 615. Eules of construction are a means to an
end, being methods of reasoning which experience has
taught will lead to intention. When such rules have been
settled, it is the duty of the court to enforce them; otherwise, titles are rendered uncertain and insecure. Such
recognized canons in deed cases are either identical or
closely analogous to the rules controlling in contract
cases. 16 Am. Jur. 527-8. The problem is to determine
the sense in which the words were used, not what the
words mean in their technical sense. 16 Am. Jur. 580.
In arriving at such intent, we submit that the following fundamental rules are applicable:
(a) The question's to whether Exhibit "B" reserved
oil and gas is to be determined by ascertaining
the intention of the parties thereto at the time
and under the conditions existing when the Deed
was made.
If oil and gas were reserved by Exhibit "B", reliance for that result must be placed on the words "other
precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining
rights" in the clause reserving "all the coal, gold, silver,
lead, copper and other precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights", and particularly on the
word "minerals". However, it is of primary importance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to note here that the reservation was not of "minerals"
alone, but that such word was used with several general
words following an enumeration of specific minerals and
ores.
The bare reservation of "all minerals" without any
amplifying, explanatory or qualifying provisions indicating some other intention, has been held quite generally
to include gas and oil, but where other words used in
connection with the reservation and other provisions in
the deed show the true intention of the parties, any prima
facie meaning of the term " minerals" must give way
and the true intention must be effectuated.
Any prima facie meaning must also yield to the
intention considering the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the instrument was
made. Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 160 Pac. 121.
See

Annotation,

L.R.A.

1918A

491, which

states

that cases construing "minerals" as including oil and
gas are not necessarily opposed to those reaching an
opposite result as regards the particular instrument
under construction, and that the words "minerals, mines
and mining rights" do not have an absolute definition
when used in legal documents, it being necessary to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument in
which the term is used. Prindle v. Baker, 116 W. Va. 48,
178 S.E. 513, 514; Winsett v. Watson (Tex.) 206 S.W. 2d
656; Dierk Lumber & Coal Co. v. Myer, 85 Fed. Supp.
157.
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In 1916 it appears obvious that the parties were not
thinking in terms of oil and gas. There was no reason
for them to consider such items. How, then, could the
Grantor have been intending by Exhibit " B " to reserve
items of which it was not thinking, particularly in view
of the fact that no consideration was given to oil and
gas in determining land values in the Sevier — Sanpete
area. If the Court places itself in the position of the
parties in 1916 and takes notice of any mutations in
language, we feel the conclusion is inescapable that oil
and gas were not intended to be reserved.
1 Summers

Oil & Gas, Section 135, contains an

excellent discussion on the subject as to "When a grant
or reservation of minerals includes oil and gas". I t is
pointed out that when the Grantor, instead of using the
words "oil and gas" uses the term "minerals", a question
arises since that word is not a definite term and its
meaning necessarily depends on the intent with which
it is used. The following language is quoted:
" I n a restricted and scientific use of the term,
oil and gas are not minerals but hydrocarbon compounds. I t is only in a broad sense, if all matters
be divided into animal, vegetable and mineral,
that oil and gas may be termed mineral,since they
are neither animal or vegetable . . . From the fact
that intention is . . . the controlling element . . .
it is evident that there is bound to be much apparent conflict of authority, some courts holding
that gas and oil are, and others that they are not,
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included. If, however, the cases are viewed from
the standpoint of intention of the parties, they
may be entirely consistent".
Summers points out that the language of the instrument and the facts and circumstances surrounding
the parties have led courts in a number of instances to
conclude that oil or gas were not included in grants or
reservations of minerals. Various cases to that effect
are quoted by him under Footnotes 25, 29 and 35.
In Rice v. Blanton (Ky. 1929) 22 S.W. 2d 580, 232
Ky. 195, the court held there was no conveyance of oil
and gas because of the wording of the instruments and
also in view of the extrinsic evidence admitted to explain
intention, even though the words "pipe lines" were used
in the documents involved.
Three Utah cases, to-wit, Nephi Plastering & Mfg.
Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 Pacific 53; Utah
Copper Co. v. Montana - Bingham Cons. Mining Co.,
69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672; and Deseret Livestock Co. v.
State et al, 110 Utah 239, 171 Pac, 2d 401, were cited by
counsel for Kespondents in the District Court Arguments
and Briefs, but we submit that not one of these cases is
in point or any authority in the present situation. In
addition, two of them were decided after 1916 and none
had to do with the determination as to whether or not
oil and gas were minerals within the terms of a grant or
reservation.
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In connection with determining the intention of the
parties, in view of the conditions which existed in 1916,
the Court's attention is directed by way of judicial notice
to the publication "Oil and Gas Possibilities of Utah"
compiled by Dr. George G. Hansen and to Plate II entitled "Oil and Gas Wells of Utah, 1891-1948", which was
published in connection therewith and is a part thereof.
This publication shows that the closest wells drilled in
Utah to the area involved in the instant Appeal prior to
1916 were in the Hanksville area of Wayne County, both
being "dry" wells, and that a well was drilled in the Mt.
Pleasant area of Sanpete County in 1918 which was also
a "dry" well and was completed after Exhibits "B" and
" D " were executed.
Furthermore, a "dry" well was drilled at Ephraim,
Sanpete County, Utah, in 1920 prior to the execution of
Exhibit "C", and during 1920 it is a matter of common
knowledge and judicial notice that there was a flurry of
interest and excitement in the Redmond—Axtell area in
Sevier and Sanpete Counties, Utah, concerning oil and
gas, and a number of Oil and Gas Leases were taken.
The well-drilling history of Utah prior to 1916 would
certainly tend to show that the parties to Exhibits "B"
and "D" had no reason to be thinking in terms of gas
and oil in that year, particularly in view of the location,
elevation and topography of the area covered thereby.
There were reasons in 1920 to think of oil and gas, which
explains the specific mention of those items in the 1920
Deed, Exhibit "C".
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(b) In determining the Grantor's intention, the entire Deed and all of its provisions, clauses and
context are to be taken into consideration, including easements or privileges which help to
show such intention. 16 Am. Jur. 532, 533, 534.
36 Am. Jur. 305 states the rule as follows:
"In determining what is included in 'miner/ als' as used in the conveyance, the term must be
, construed in the light of the particular transaction and with reference to the nature of the
instrument and its context, and where there is
nothing else showing just what substances the
••'
parties intended to include by the language of the
grant, the intention of the parties as to the extent
of the minerals granted may be determined from
the language of the mining rights granted as incident thereto."
16 Am. Jur. 533 states that in applying the rule, the
court is not confined to a strict and literal construction
of the language used where such construction will frustrate the intention of the parties, and that particular
words and clauses will not be stressed. It is not sufficient
to resort to isolated words or phrases.
Before citing the case authorities we feel to be in
point on this phase, we call attention to the language of
Exhibit' 'B" which throws light on the intention:
First of all, after enumerating specific items being
reserved, the phrase used is "other valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights". Nothing is said about
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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drilling or boring rights or wells. The words "mining
rights" help explain the items being identified and reserved, and exclude oil and gas.
Secondly, there is a reservation of rights-of-way for
roads, railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, water
pipelines, depot grounds and grounds for building coal
mine appurtenances, no mention being made of easements
for oil or gas pipelines, tanks, derricks, or anything having to do with boring and drilling for or extracting and
removing gas and oil.
The next "reservation" paragraph reserves the right
to "go upon the surface . . . to prospect for coal, gold,
silver, lead, copper and other precious and valuable ores
. . . " with no mention being made of any right to drill
or prospect for oil and gas, of even minerals generally,
indicative again of the fact that the parties were not
thinking of oil and gas or intending to reserve the same
but were thinking of ores and minerals of the type they
listed. The reservation of timber also shows the Grantor
was thinking in terms of mines and timbers for use therein.
The next reservation is of water "developed through
tunnels or other underground works" which would seem
to eliminate water developed by the drilling of wells for
gas and oil, showing again that Grantor did not have in
mind the drilling of wells.
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Every single easement and right reserved is consistent with the conclusion that oil and gas were not
intended to be reserved and is inconsistent with the conclusion that oil and gas were intended to be and were
reserved.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the applicable
rule in Haynes v. Hunt, et al., 96 Utah 348, 85 Pac. 2d
861, wherein it has quoted the following language with
approval:
"A more modern rule and that now followed
by the greater number of courts is that the whole
deed and every part thereof is to be taken into
consideration in determining the intent of the
grantor, and clauses in the deed subsequent to the
granting clauses are given effect so as to curtail,
limit or qualify the estate conveyed in the granting clause."
Courts in other jurisdictions have had occasion to
determine the intent of the parties to Deeds in a number
of cases involving recitations of easements and privileges
inconsistent with or inappropriate to drilling for oil and
gas and extracting and removing the same. Some of
these are annotated in 86 A.L.R. 987 and 37 A.L.R. 2d
1453-4. In Murphy v. VanVoorhis (W. Va. 1938) 119
S.E. 297, the Court stated:
"It is apparent that the reservation for mining rights is for oil purposes, and the right of
ingress and egress, and of placing machinery on
the lands for oil purposes. The reservation expressly so states."
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The Court held that natural gas was not included in
the reservation referring to minerals, even though
ordinarily "minerals" would include both oil and gas.
In McKinney's Heirs v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co.
(Ky. 1909) 120 S.W. 314, 20 Ann. Cas. 934, the Court
construed the instruments as a whole and stated that
if natural gas was in the minds of the parties at the time,
it would be expected to find terms referring specifically
to the rights and privileges necessary to its development,
and "that the absence of such expressions, and the presence of other easements not applicable to the production of natural gas, tended to show that it was not the
intention that gas was to be included . . . If natural gas
was in the minds of the parties . . . we would expect to
find terms which would refer specifically to the rights . . .
necessary to the development of it. We erect derricks
and drill for gas and pipe it to market, but there was not
a grant of a right to the use of timber in erecting derricks
or of an easement for pipelines or with reference to the
removal of machinery used in drilling."
In Hudson v. McGuire (Ky. 1920) 223 S.W. 1101,
17 A.L.E. 148, the words used were "all of the minerals
(except stone coal), are conveyed with necessary right
of ways and privileges for prospecting, mining and smelting." The Court held that while the word "minerals"
generally is construed to include oil and gas, the addition
here of "mining and smelting" required the introduction
of extrinsic evidence to determine the intention of the
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parties. This case discusses not only the point mentioned
above, but covers very thoroughly the various rules and
canons of construction referred to in the instant Brief.
The Court's attention is respectfully called to that case
in its entirety as being peculiarly analogous to our situation. In it the Court calls attention to the fact that the
words "mining and smelting" have no place in the grant
of oil or gas rights or privileges and that the use of these
words, as well as the absence of suitable words to show
that the oil or gas was intended to be conveyed, was
sufficient to put a Grantee on notice that the grant did
not include oil or gas.
The Court stated in Shell Oil Co. v. Moore (111.) 48
N.E. 2d 400, that since the intention of the parties is to
be determined, it follows that anything in the Deed of a
qualifying, limiting or explanatory nature may be considered.
In Hide Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co.
(La. 1922) 91 So. 676, the reservation of "the exclusive
right to the iron, coal and other minerals" was held to
exclude oil and gas where the following phraseology used
was "all necessary privileges of mining on said land,
and also the rights of way for rail and tramways for
mining purposes through any portion of said land herein
conveyed." The Court concluded that only solids, such
as coal and iron were in contemplation, since nothing was
said about boring, drilling or laying pipelines.
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The case of Barnard-Arque-Roth-Stearns Oil & Gas
Co. v. Farquharson (Eng. 1912) AC 864, Ann. Cas. 1913B
1212, is authority for the conclusion that even though
the reservation was of "all mines and quarries of metals
and minerals, and all springs of oil in or under said
land", natural gas was not reserved since the words used
indicated that "minerals" was not used in the wide and
general sense as including all substances not denominated
vegetable or animal, and also since further words in the
reservation stated that the Grantor reserved the privilege of "search for, work, win, and carry away the
same", which words were not applicable to a thing of
the nature of natural gas.
Additional cases are annotated in 1 A.L.R. 2d 787
following the case of Carson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co., et at (Ark. 1948) 209 S.W. 2d 97, 1 A.L.K. 2d 784.
In Gordon v. Carter Oil Co. (1924) 19 Ohio App. 319,
a Deed conveyed "all the coal and other minerals" with
the right to enter on the land to make excavations, drains,
etc., and with a right-of-way across the land "for the purpose of transferring said minerals from the land." The
court held that in view of the language used in the Deed
and the circumstances and surroundings of the parties
at the time, oil and gas did not pass under "other minerals," as such was not the contemplation of the parties.
See also Horse Creek Land & Mining Co. v. Midkiff
(1918) 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26.
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On the same theory, the Court in Praeletorian Diamond Oil Association v. Ga/rvey, (Tex. 15) 15 S.W. 2d
698, held that a Mineral Lease covering "oil, gas and
other minerals" did not include gravel, since the Lease
provided for the erection of derricks, tanks and pipelines
but contained no provision for mining or disposition of
gravel.
The Court in Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. v.
Right of Way Oil Company (Tex. 1911) 137 S.W. 171,
states that effect and meaning must be given to every
part of the Deed and that the intent is deducible from
the entire instrument and the language employed therein. To similar import is Kentucky W. Va. Gas Co. v.
Preece, et al, (Ky. 1935) 86 S.W. 2d 163, in which the
conveyance was "all the coal, salt, water and minerals
of every description . . . and the right to use the land for
the purpose of exploring, extracting, storing, handling,
manufacturing, refining, shipping or transporting all
said minerals." The Court held this conveyance included
oil and gas because the rights granted in connection with
minerals have particular application theerto.
In California, the Courts state that oil may be regarded as a "mineral" if the word stands alone, but in
Cormvell v. Buck & Stoddard (Calif. 1938) 82 Pac. 2d
516, the Court held that the production of oil was not
"mining" within the meaning of the California Code.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
Dictionary definitions at and prior to the year 1916,
including Black's Law Dictionary, 1910 Edition, Page
780, did not refer to the extraction of oil and gas as being
"mining." In addition to the California case, it was held
in State v. Indiana, etc., Mm. Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 N.E.
778, 6 L.E.A. 579, and Williams v. Citizens
Enterprise
Co., 153 Ind. 496, 55 N.E. 425, that as ordinarily used,
the term "mining" does not include sinking wells or
shafts for petroleum or natural gas. Since the reference
in Exhibits " B " and " D " is to "mining rights," it is
evident that the parties did not intend to reserve in the
one case, or to grant in the other case, oil and gas.
The case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., et al., v.
Strohacker, 152 S.W. 2d 557, 202 Ark. 645, analyzes various cases in connection with the construction of reservations referring to "minerals" and emphasizes the necessity of ascertaining the intent from the language used
and the general circumstances existing. The Court refers
to numerous other cases including New Jersey and
United States Supreme Court cases requiring reference
to the time when and the circumstances under which the
Deed was made, and stating that a contemporaneous construction is best and should be adopted.
Detlor v. Holland (Ohio 1898) 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.E.A.
266, involved a conveyance in which the language used
was as follows:
"Do hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey
to the said Michael L. Deaver, his heirs and assigns, forever, all the coal of every variety, and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
all the iron ore, fire clay, and other valuable minerals in, on, or under the following described
premises: . . . together with the right in perpetuity to the said Michael L. Deaver, or his assigns,
of mining and removing such coal, ore or other
minerals; and the said Michael L. Deaver, or his
assigns, shall also have the right to the use of so
much of the surface of the land as may be necessary for pits, shafts, platforms, drains, railroads,
switches, side tracks, etc., to facilitate the mining
and removing of such coal, ore, or other minerals,
and no more."
The Court asked the question "Do the words 'other
valuable minerals' include petroleum oil?" and then called
attention to the fact that the Deed was made in 1890
and must be construed in the light of oil developments
as they then existed in the area, that Grantor was not
shown to have any knowledge of the existence of oil in
or near these lands, although oil was then produced in
small quantities within from 10 to 20 miles, but there was
nothing to show the parties had any knowledge thereof,
that the incidents granted were all such as are peculiarly
applicable to the mining of minerals in place, and not
such as are in their nature of a migratory character, such
as oil and gas. The Court further stated that nothing is
said about derricks, pipelines, tanks, the use of water
for drilling, or the removal of machinery used in drilling
or operating oil or gas wells. After stating that the
grant is to be construed most strongly against the Grantor, that the whole contract is to be considered to determine intention, that ordinarily "minerals" taken in its
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broadest sense would include petroleum oil, and that if
the easements granted had been intended to be applicable
to producing oil, the parties would have used such words
to express such intention, the Court concluded that the
title to oil did not pass under the conveyance.
The annotations in 17 A.L.R. 156, 86 A.L.E. 983, and
37 A.L.R. 2d 1441, discuss the rule now under consideration as well as the other canons herein cited. Other helpful authorities are Car others v. Mills (Tex. 1921) 232
S.W. 155; U.S. Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co.
(6 Cir. 1924) 296 Fed. 320; Clements v. Morgan (Ky.
1948) 211 S.W. 2d 164, and the following recent decisions :
Easley et al v. Melton et al (Ky. 1953) 262 S.W. 2d 686;
Witherspoon et ux v. Campbell (Miss. 1954) 69 So. 2d
384; Elkhom Coal Corp. et al v. Yonts et al (Ky. 1953)
262 S.W. 2d 384; and Long et al v. Madison Coal Co.,
(Ky. 1954) 125 F. Supp. 937, 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 226.
The annotation in 17 A.L.E. 156 follows the case of
Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co.,
17 A.L.E, 144, a West Virginia case in which the Court
states that the term "mineral" is not a definite one capable of a definition of universal application but is susceptible of limitation according to the intention of the
parties using it, that in determining its meaning regard
must be had not only to the language used but also to the
relative position of the parties and the substance of the
transaction. In this case the Deed granted "coal and all
other minerals" and then went on to grant certain rights
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ta be enjoyed by the Grantee in the production of such
minerals, including the right to make and maintain "all
necessary railroads, excavations, ways, shafts, drains,
drainways, and openings necessary and convenient for
the mining and removal of said coal and other minerals,"
and contained other provisions relative to hauling and
transporting coal and other minerals. A number of cases
and authorities are quoted, including Lindley, Mines &
Mining, Sections 87 et seq., 18 E.C.L. 1093, and Suit v. A.
Hochstetter

Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317-323, 61 S.E. 307. The

Court states that substantial aid is afforded by the language used in the Deed in conveying said mining rights
in determining what the parties meant by the term "other
minerals," and states that the rights granted were such
as are incident to the production of minerals by means of
mines; that is, by shafting or tunneling. The West Virginia Court in the Rock House case cited with approval
the decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York to the
effect that the meaning of words used in a grant will be
construed in the light of the language used in granting
mining rights, and that where the mining rights are those
involved in the ordinary processes of mining, the items
granted will be limited to such things as are recoverable
by such processes.
All of the foregoing authorities support our contention that when the entire Deed, Exhibit " B " , and all of its
provisions, clauses and context are considered, including
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the easements or privileges reserved, it is evident that
the Grantor did not reserve nor intend to reserve the oil
and gas rights.
(c) In the construction of deeds, the rule of ejusdem
generis shoidd be applied. If there is an enumeration of particulars, followed by a sweeping
clause comprising other things, the scope of such
clause is restricted to things, within the description, of the same hind a,s the particulars enumerated. 16 Am. Jur. 537. Similarly, the expression
of a particular subject implies the exclusion of
subjects not enumerated, or, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. As stated in 16 Am. Jur. 537:
"If a deed covers particidar or express matters,
the intention may be inferred to exclude other
subjects which the general words of the deed
may have been sufficient to include ..."
In Huie Hodge Lumber

Co. v. Railroad Lands

Co.

(supra), the Deed reserved "the exclusive right to iron,
coal, and other minerals . . ." The Court held that the
rule of ejusdem generis required that the words "other
minerals" following the specific terms "coal" and "iron"
be construed as intending or including other minerals of a
character similar to coal and iron, such as solids or minerals in place, requiring mining for their removal instead
of drilling. To the same effect are the decisions in Right
of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co. (Tex.
1913) 157 S.W. 737, 51 L.E.A. N.S. 268, and Horse Creek
Land & Min. Co. v. Midkiff

(W. Va. 1918) 95 S.E. 26, and
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the cases cited in the Annotations in 17 A.L.R. 164, 86
A.L.R. 987, and 37 A.L.R. 2d 1449, to which the Court's
attention is respectfully invited in connection with the
instant point and the other rules cited.
In Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil etc.,
(supra) where the Deed referred to ''timber, earth, stone
and mineral," the Court held that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the word "mineral" should be applied to the
same class as the particular words listed, that is, materials found upon land near the surface, as gravel and the
like, and not "mineral oil" which is found at great depth
and is of much greater value.
If the parties to Exhibit "B" had intended to reserve
oil and gas, they would have so stated, just as they did
in connection with Exhibit "C" which was made nearly
five years later in connection with an adjoining tract.
In Vogel v. Cobb, (Okla, 1943) 141 Pac. 2d 276, 148
A.L.R. 774, it was held, applying the rule of ejusdem
generis, that ' 'water was not conveyed by a grant of the
oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt and all minerals of every
kind or character" or a grant "of the oil, gas and other
minerals in and under and that may be produced from"
the land.
In Exhibit "B" the case is clear for an application
of the rules of ejusdem generis and expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, since the general or sweeping clause
follows an enumeration of particular items, from which it
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should be concluded that the scope of the general clause
is restricted to things of the same kind and character as
the particulars listed, and that having listed these particular items of a particular type the intention must be
inferred to exclude other subjects which the general
words of the Deed may have been sufficient to include.
(d) A Grant is construed most strongly against the
Grantor when the language is ambiguous or
doubtful, particularly in the case of exceptions
or reservations.
16 Am. Jur. 599 and 615, 36
Am. Jur. 303, and Bundy v. Myers et al (Pa.
1953) 94 A. 2d 724, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 352, in
which the reservation clause read:
". . . excepting and reserving, out of this
land, the oil, coal, fire clay and minerals of
every kind and character with rights of entry
for the removal of the same . . ."
The Court held that gas was not reserved, even
though oil was specifically mentioned, along with " minerals of every kind and character." To the same effect
see Barker

v. Campbell-Ratcliff

Land Co. (Okla.) 167

Pac. 468.
As stated in 16 Am. Jur. 615:
"Also, in virtue of the rule that a grant is
construed most strongly against the grantor, when
the language of an exception or reservation is
ambiguous or doubtful, it will be construed in such
way as to resolve doubts against the grantor in
favor of the grantee, for the grant will not be
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cut down by the subsequent reservation to any
extent beyond that indicated by the intention of
the parties as gathered from the whole instrument."
This follows largely because the Grantor selects his own
words and the Deed is prima facie an expression of the
intention of the grantor.
In connection with Exhibit "B", the Knight Investment Company and its agents and officers selected the
words to be used and indicated the items being reserved.
The wording used, as indicated above, shows that gas and
oil were not intended to be reserved, but if any ambiguity
or obscurity exists, such ambiguity should be resolved
against the Grantor in accordance with the foregoing
rule.
We feel that the fair and logical application of the
foregoing rules of construction lead inescapably to the
conclusion that if Exhibit "B" is interpreted on its face
without resort to extrinsic matters of any kind, except
such as the Court may judicially notice in construing
said Deed, that gas and oil were not intended to be nor
were they reserved by virtue thereof.
B. Argument based on the assumption that the
Court determines Exhibit "B" to be ambiguous and to
require resort to extrinsic matters to construe the same
and to determine the intention of the parties thereto as
to whether gas and oil were reserved.
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If, however, the Court determines that Exhibit "B"
is obscure and ambiguous as to whether or not oil and
gas were reserved, then resort should be had to the complete Record on Appeal and to any items therein contained to throw light on the intention of the parties. In
this connection, it is pointed out that in December, 1920,
the same parties made a third Deed, Exhibit "C", in
which Knight Investment Company expressly reserved
and listed hydro-carbons, gas and oil in addition to the
same items and language previously used in Exhibit "B"
in March, 1916.
Exhibit "C" is admitted as part of the Stipulation,
and certainly throws light on the intention of the parties
in connection with the 1916 Deeds, since it discloses that
in 1920, after the drilling of two wells in Sanpete County,
Utah, after the adoption of the Federal Leasing Act of
1920, and after a flurry of excitement concerning oil and
gas in the relatively nearby Sanpete-Sevier area, the parties, particularly Knight Investment Company, had in
mind oil and gas and therefore expressly listed the same,
as contrasted to the situation in 1916 when oil and gas
were not listed and were not in the minds of the parties.
The 1920 Deed is very helpful and significant, for
in it the Knight Investment Company and its attorney
and officers saw fit to include and did include a reservation of the same items as those mentioned in the 1916
Deeds, but added three specific items: "hydro-carbons,
gas and oil."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
In this 1920 Deed the parties were thinking in terms
of oil and gas and so showed. The fact that they used
the specific words to describe them, at the same time
using the words "mineral products" shows that they did
not consider that such phrase "mineral products" included oil and gas. They thus recognized that oil and
gas were not included in the 1916 reservation and grant,
because they had not intended to reserve them, and that
to include them in the 1920 reservation it was not sufficient to rely on the general term "mineral products".
Parties intend to use the words that they do use,
and they intend to use them for a purpose. In 1920 they
intended oil and gas to be reserved and so stated. If they
had been thinking in terms of oil and gas in 1916 and
had wanted to reserve them in Exhibit "B" and convey
them in Exhibit "D", they would have said so.
What better act of the parties is there than the 1920
Deed (Exhibit "C") to show that the parties did not have
oil and gas in mind in the 1916 Deeds, Exhibits "B" and
"D"?
Furthermore, Exhibit " 0 " (K, 117) shows that the
purpose of the Knight Investment Company under its
Articles of Incorporation was in connection with "mining, smelting, milling" and did not refer to drilling or related activities.
All of the rules of construction listed above apply
and should be given proper effect, even though the Court
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determines that Exhibit " B " was obscure and that resort must be had to extrinsic matters. In other words,
those rules of construction should still be applied and
should be coupled with resort to such other extrinsic
matters as may be in the record and as may be pertinent
to the inquiry in determining intention.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT ISAAC D. VOORHEES AND WIFE CONVEYED TO
KNIGHT INVESTMENT COMPANY BY EXHIBIT "D" (R.
85-86A) THE OIL AND GAS WITHIN TRACT III ABOVE
MENTIONED.

A. Argument based on the assumption that the
Court holds Exhibit "D" to be clear and unambiguous on
its face and to require construction thereof without resort to extrameous matters in determining whether or
not the intention was to grant oil and gas.
In contrast to Exhibit " B " which is the subject of
argument under Point I above and which involves the
construction to be placed on reservations contained therein, Exhibit "D", which is the subject of the instant argument, involves the construction to be placed on grants
contained therein. Exhibit " D " was made under date of
April 3, 1916, or five days after Exhibit " B " was made.
By Exhibit "D", Isaac D. Voorhees and wife conveyed
and granted to Knight Investment Company the items
and rights listed therein, the wording being set forth in
the above Statement of Facts (p. 4). It is to be noted that
the description of the items reserved in the one Deed
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(Exhibit " B " ) is identical with the description of the
items conveyed in Exhibit U D " , the properties involved
being different, of course.
It follows that the rights of the ^Respondents herein
depend, in the case of the properties described in Exhibit
" B " and involved herein, on whether or not Knight Investment Company reserved oil and gas by that Deed/
whereas in connection with the properties involved herein
and included in Exhibit "D", Bespondents' rights depend
on whether or not Knight Investment Company was
granted the oil and gas by said Deed.
The same rules, canons, principles, and arguments
set forth under Point I above apply to Point II. In addition, however, we point out that in defining the rights and
items being granted by Exhibit "D", the parties used the
same language as that used by Knight Investment Company in connection with its reservations under Exhibit
" B " . It appears clear that Knight Investment Company,
therefore, was the author of both instruments. The parties used the language they intended to use. The Knight
Investment Company was interested in certain items,
which it listed and defined in particular terms followed
by general terms, again calling for the application of the
rules of ejusdem generis and expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Here again, if Knight Investment Company had been
interested in purchasing and acquiring oil and gas, it
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would have been so stated. The grant was not of the
fee simple title, with reservations of certain items as in
Exhibit " B " , but was a grant of a limited and restricted
number of items. Herein again, the mining rights, easements and privileges granted indicate the intention of
the parties as to just what "minerals" were intended to
be and were conveyed by Mr. and Mrs. Voorhees to
Knight Investment Company. Exhibit " D " was a retention by Voorhees of their fee simple title, and a grant of
"coal, gold, silver, lead, copper and other precious and
valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights" and of
easements or rights-of-way for roads, railroads, telephone and telegraph lines, water pipe lines (not oil and
gas lines or ivells), depot grounds, etc., by paying certain amounts, and of other easements, all of such a nature as to indicate that the parties were thinking of the
mining of hard or solid materials and not of the drilling
and boring of wells or the extraction, storage, or removal
of oil and gas.
B. Argument based on the assumption that the
Court determines Exhibit "D" to be obscure and ambiguous on its face sand to require resort to extraneous matters to construe the same and to detemine whether or
not the parties thereto intended to grant oil and gas.
The arguments presented above in connection with
Point I (B) apply with equal force and effect to Point
I I (B) and for that reason are not repeated.
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We urge upon the Court the conclusion that Exhibit
D" did not convey or grant oil and gas rights to Knight
Investment Company, but served to retain the same in
Voorhees, the predecessor in interest of the Appellants
Arthur H. Nell, Lorna V. Nell, and Luella T. Voorhees,
and that the District Court's decision to the contrary
is erroneous.
U

CONCLUSION
In connection with Point I, involving the construction
to be placed on Exhibit "B", we respectfully contend that
the parties thereto did not intend the said Deed to reserve oil and gas, and that such is true whether the Deed
is construed on its face and without resort to extraneous
matters or whether the Deed is held to be ambiguous and
obscure on its face so as to require resort to the extraneous matters before the Court in the Record on Appeal
in order to determine the intention of the parties to said
Deed with respect to oil and gas.
In connection with Point II, involving the construction to be placed on Exhibit "D", we respectfully submit
that the parties thereto did not intend said Deed to grant
oil and gas, and that such conclusion should be reached
whether the Deed is construed without resort to extraneous matters or, on the ground that it is held to be obDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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scure on its face, is construed in the light of the extraneous matters before the Court in connection with the
Motions for Summary Judgment.
For all the reasons hereinabove stated, the Appellants request that the decision of the District Court be
reversed and that Findings, Conclusions and Decree be
entered in favor of Appellants on their Cross-Motion
for Summary Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
1% •

GUSTIN, EICHAEDS & MATTSSON
By

CARVEL MATTSSON

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

LAW

UtmAUs'

UTAH DOCUMENT COUiCHON
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

